# ADMiGOV

Advancing Alternative Migration Governance

Migration and Development of Displaced Syrians in Lebanon

Deliverable 6.2

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Publication information

Acknowledgements

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AUB	American University of Beirut
CAT	Convention Against Torture
CEDRE	Conférence économique pour le développement, par les réformes et avec les entreprises
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund
ESDF	Economic Fund for Social Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
HRW	Human Rights Watch
GSD	General Security Directorate
GoL	Government of Lebanon
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LHSP	Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme
LOUISE	Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organisational System for E-card
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
MPCA	Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA)
NPTP	National Program Targeting Poverty
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
VASyR	Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan

Figures and Tables

1. Executive Summary/Abstract

This report provides an evaluation of the relationship between development interventions and migration decision-making in the context of Syrians displaced in Lebanon. It aims to critically inform policy and development practice and guide the establishment of migration governance indicators.

Ten years after the beginning of the conflict, the situation of Syrians fleeing to Lebanon deteriorated. The funds the EU and other donors provided to assist the country with the needs of refugees and host communities didn't change the situation on the ground. While Lebanon faces multiple crises, including socio-political, economic, and infrastructural challenges amidst a pandemic, Syrian displaced, perceive themselves as stuck in a 'limbo' state. A dignified return to a safe Syria isn't guaranteed, and resettlement to a third host country is a lengthy process granted to a minority (RPW, 2020, p. 5).

Our results demonstrate a lack of coherent and adequate support from government authorities. Indeed, the Lebanese response to the inflow of Syrian refugees has been marked by institutional ambiguity. The decision to deny the status of refugees to Syrians generated illegality and disregarded human rights and protection. On the other hand, the no-camp policy of the Government of Lebanon has created an uneven landscape of aid and service provision, where humanitarian actors face increasing difficulty in providing much-needed assistance to displaced Syrians scattered throughout the urban fabric in contrast to those in informal camps (UN-Habitat, 2020). In addition, displaced Syrians face different rules and regulations depending on where they now dwell. In addition, our respondents reported that the support was inadequate and didn't match their expectations. Through this report, we uncovered gaps in the governance of the Syrian migratory phenomena, and we proposed recommendations for bettering the assistance to the displaced communities and respecting their fundamental human rights.

2. Introduction

This report highlights the relationship between development interventions and migrant decision-making, both on the initial decision to migrate or return decision-making factors and decision-making in 'transit' countries or countries of first reception. As part of the work package on 'development', the overall package aims for a comparative assessment between Turkey, Lebanon, Mali, and Ethiopia, where two countries with a large reserve of displaced people (Turkey and Lebanon), and two countries of extreme poverty (Ethiopia and Mali) are studied. In Turkey and Lebanon, we are looking at exploring the displaced population. In Mali and Ethiopia, it's a comparative assessment between locals and displaced people as per the project's scope. The overall study aims to provide an evaluation of the relationship between development interventions and migration decision-making in a comparative context between four countries. This is done to critically inform policy and development practice on the relationship between migration decision-making and development and guide the development of indicators on the governance of migration and development.

This report focuses on the Lebanese case and gives a general overview of the country's situation. It builds on the work the AUB team conducted for the same research in WP4. It focuses on Syrian migration trends and development interventions through a literature review and researches these themes on the ground in two different geographical locations: the coast, specifically the city of Saida, and the Bekaa, an inland valley bound by the Lebanese and anti-Lebanese mountain ranges. The selected localities compare two typologies of Syrian informal settlements in Lebanon: the Informal Tented Settlement (ITS) in the agricultural valley of the Bekaa and a built structure at the outskirt of Saida, a main city on the southern Lebanese coast. These sites are located in the most vulnerable Lebanese Cadastres that host the highest number of displaced Syrians.

Moreover, they were selected considering that the project's principal investigator has worked on the areas during previous research projects alongside the Center for Civic Engagement and Community Service at the American University of Beirut. In Saida, we initially targeted displaced Syrians in a collective urban shelter (the Ouzai shelter). However, throughout our data collection, we learnt that around October 2020, Syrians were evicted from the shelter and are now dispersed throughout the city and in other locations in the country [for more information on the case study sites, please refer to Trovato et al. (2020)].

1.1 Report Structure

This report is structured as follows: in the introductory chapter, we give a general overview of the aim of this research and the geographical areas of our study. In Chapter 2, we describe the country's context. We start by giving a brief overview of the country's situation and the governance of displaced Syrians since the onset of the Syrian crisis. Then, we summarise the laws and regulations for displaced Syrians in Lebanon, highlighting their living conditions and migration aspirations. An overview of development projects and funding mechanisms follows this. Chapter 3 provides the methodology that includes both quantitative and qualitative assessment. Next, we explain the survey instrument, which delves into the following subject areas: basic information, employment status, migration history, migration aspirations, development intervention policies, risk attitude, household characteristics, household network, access and assets, and well-being. Chapter 4 presents the results obtained by offering a descriptive profile of respondents, migration aspirations, and development interventions.   Finally, in Chapter 5, we present our discussion, conclusions, and recommendations in Chapter 6.

2. Country Context

2.1 Brief Overview of the country situation

The Syrian crisis is one of the most significant events of forced displacement witnessed in the past decades (UNHCR, 2019). Since 2011, Syrians have made their way to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, which hosts the highest number of displaced Syrians, and Lebanon, which ranks highest worldwide when comparing the number of displaced persons to the national population (ibid.). Lebanon is a relatively small country with approximately 4 million persons and hosts 2 million displaced, of which around 1.5 million are Syrians (LCRP, 2019). The situation in Lebanon is particular as the country faces multiple crises, including socio-political, economic, and infrastructural challenges amidst a pandemic. With limited options in a deteriorating economy, displaced Syrians and poor Lebanese rely more on aid assistance to survive. Since late 2019, the Lebanese Lira has lost almost 80% of its value, and extreme poverty and poverty rates have risen remarkably. A study by ESCWA (2020) revealed that 55% of the Lebanese population is in poverty, while 90% of displaced Syrians are in extreme poverty. Displaced Syrians are now stuck in a state of "limbo" as conditions worsen in Lebanon, a dignified return to a safe Syria isn't guaranteed, and resettlement to a third host country is a lengthy process granted to a minority (RPW, 2020, p. 5). The situation in the country was further exacerbated by the August 4th, 2020, Beirut Port explosion that shook the city's foundations, injured and killed many, damaged the port and properties at the heart of the city and rendered thousands homeless. The situation in Lebanon in 2021 continued to deteriorate. The surveys highlight conditions relevant at the time the survey was conducted, and we acknowledge that some decisions may have changed following as the crisis further developed in the country.

In response to the Syrian crisis, Lebanon's governance approach transitioned from an 'open door policy' – practised during the initial emergency phase that lasted till 2014 – followed by a 'closed-door policy' – still in effect today (Fawaz et al., 2018; Trovato et al., 2021). Since the issuance of the Policy Paper on Syrian Displacement in 2014, enforced in May 2015, UNHCR stopped registering Syrians as refugees, and the de-registration of Syrians that had entered in January of that same year ensued (ibid.). The GoL's strict actions and closed-door policy only changed the label given to displaced Syrians by increasing the number of economic migrants and decreasing "Syrians registered as refugees by UNHCR" (Janmyr, 2018). This situation led to a reliance on the highly contested sponsorship system for immigrant workers as a method of legal entry and an increase in cases of illegal entry. A vulnerability assessment indicated that around 3/4 of displaced Syrians still lacked valid residency permits in 2019, increasing to 80% in 2020 (VASyR, 2019, 2020). Having an illegal status threatens the daily experience of displaced Syrians, from restrictions on movement due to security checkpoints, informal arrests at the workplace, decreased chances of finding employment, or not receiving the agreed-upon monetary compensation for labour, as well as evictions at their place of residence. This has been compounded by the haphazard curfews throughout the country by different municipalities, especially during COVID-19 lockdown measures in 2020. Curfews were reported as the primary security concern among displaced Syrians, often enforced due to tensions between the local community and displaced Syrians (VASyR, 2019).

2.1.1 Migration situation

Lacking the necessary documentation also makes leaving Lebanon harder. Lebanon has reiterated that it's not a country of asylum, but rather one of transit (Fakhoury, 2017; LCRP, 2019; Lebanon Support, 2020). However, many Syrians that have entered since the beginning of the crisis have not successfully resettled elsewhere. Between 2011-2020, the highest number of resettlement departures took place in 2016, out of a total of 62,000 successfully resettled Syrians by UNHCR since 2013 (fig. 1). The International Office of Immigration (IOM) has successfully resettled 100,000 displaced Syrians by June 2020 to 25 countries, including Canada, Australia, European member states, and others (IOM, 2020).

As the situation in Syria began shifting in favour of the regime, Lebanese politicians called for repatriation, which many host states were taking regardless of an ensured safe and dignified return of displaced Syrians (Fakhoury, 2020). Içduygua and Nimer (2020) argue that any debate on return is problematic since safety, voluntariness, and sustainability conditions aren't fulfilled. Regardless, in collaboration with Syrian intelligence services, the Lebanese General Security Directorate (GSD) initiated a program in 2017 to repatriate displaced Syrians in a 'safe and voluntary manner' (Dagher, 2021). By April 2021, 433,000 people had returned to Syria since 2017 (table 1), including Syrians, registered and non-registered as refugees, bearing either on their own or with the help of the GSD (ibid.). Some paid their overdue fees upon exiting, while others forfeited their right to return to Lebanon legally (ibid). However, UNHCR has no system to monitor whether Syrians have experienced a safe, dignified, and voluntary return (RPW, 2020).

Fig. 1. Graph showing resettlement by UNHCR to a third country from Lebanon, 2011-2020. Retrieved from www.unhcr.org

On the other hand, as the economic situation in Lebanon worsens, many are seeking a way out, no matter the consequences. UNHCR[1] reports 21 sea crossings attempted to Cyprus between July and September 2020, primarily Syrians and Lebanese and migrant workers.

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[1]https://www.unhcr.org/lb/13585-unhcr-and-unicef-urgent-need-to-address-the-root-causes-of-life-risking-journeys-from-lebanon-and-ensure-swift-rescue-of-people-distressed-at-sea.html#_ga=2.8127482.958519951.1602179382-207894769.1589918770

These journeys are life-risking, yet many still embark knowing their options are bleak and aim to do so before the harsh winter season begins. HRW (2020) reports that Cyprus authorities pushed back or expelled more than 200 migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from Lebanon in early September 2020. Between January 2020 and May 2021, almost 1,162 people attempted to leave Lebanon on smugglers' vessels (Sewell, 2021). Only two boats of the eight trying to depart in 2021 made it to their destination, while the rest were intercepted by Lebanese authorities or pushed back by Cypriot authorities (ibid.). Five displaced Syrians intercepted were found to have illegally entered Lebanon after April 24, 2019, and were deported by Lebanese authorities (ibid.).

Year	Resettlement	Return	Deportation	Attempts to leave[1]
2011				
2016				
2017				
2018				490 people attempted to leave Lebanon
2019	100,000 displaced Syrians resettled to a third country since the onset of the Syrian crisis	GSD program recounts 433,900 registered and non-registered displaced Syrians returning to Syria by April 12, 2021	2,730 Syrians who had illegally entered Lebanon after April 24, 2019 were deported between May and August 2019	270 people attempted to leave Lebanon
2020			Deportations halted with COVID-19 pandemic & border closure	748 people attempted to leave Lebanon
2021			15 Syrians were deported by Lebanese authorities, of which 5 were intercepted on a boat off the coast of Cyprus	414 people attempted to leave Lebanon

1. Attempts to leave on smuggler boats to Cyprus, figures may include Lebanese and non-Syrian nationalities.

Table 1. Timeline of resettlement, return, deportation, and attempts to leave Lebanon. Data compiled from Dagher (2021), Sewell (2021), IOM (2020)

2.2 Overview of target group respondents

2.2.1 Displaced Syrians' Rights In Lebanon

Refugee rights are not recognised as Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor has it signed its 1967 protocol. However, Lebanon is bound by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which grants the right to asylum for any person fearing persecution and is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization, abiding by its covenants (Lebanon Support, 2020). Lebanon is also bound by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and its optional protocol of 2008, which upholds the principles of non-refoulment (ibid.). Refugees and all foreigners in Lebanon fall under the law regulating entry, stay, and exit from Lebanon, passed in 1962. Article 26 of the law states that "any foreign national who is the subject of a prosecution or a conviction by an authority that is not Lebanese for a political crime or whose life or freedom is threatened, also for political reasons, may request political asylum in Lebanon." Furthermore, article 31 states that "when a political refugee is deported from Lebanon, he or she will not be returned to a country in which "his or her life or freedom is threatened" (Janmyr, 2016). Lebanon directly violated the principle of non-refoulement in 2019 by deporting more than 2,700 displaced Syrians after a decision taken by the Higher Defence Council (see Table 1) (Chehayeb & Sewell, 2019).

The Government of Lebanon's (GoL) governance of displaced Syrians transitioned from a laissez-faire policy of no policy phase between 2011 and 2014 (based upon bilateral agreements between Lebanon and Syria before the crisis) into a closed-door policy in 2015. With this transition came a marked change in laws regulating displaced Syrians' entry, stay, and return. First, the GoL declared its sovereign right to determine the status of Syrians according to Lebanese laws and regulations and referred to individuals fleeing Syria as "temporarily displaced individuals", disenfranchising displaced Syrians from the protection of a refugee status (LCRP, 2019, p. 4). Second, while approximately 855,000 displaced Syrians are "registered as refugees" by UNHCR[2], the remainder is not recognised and doesn't receive benefits such as monthly compensation. Registered refugees were previously requested to sign a pledge "not to work", which later changed to a commitment "to abide by Lebanese laws and regulations" (Lebanon Support, 2016, 2020). Those seeking employment must rely on sponsorship (kafala) to attain a visa to enter Lebanon, a highly criticised system that disenfranchises workers from their rights (Lebanon Support, 2018). Also, displaced Syrians are limited to the professional sectors of construction, agriculture, and environment/cleaning under a decision endorsed by the Ministry of Labor in 2014. Displaced Syrians already in Lebanon wishing to acquire a sponsor must either transfer sponsorship from another migrant worker or exit Lebanon first, risking their safety upon leaving and their ability to re-enter Lebanese territory if the process goes awry or if their sponsor has a change of mind.

2.2.2 Living Conditions

The living conditions of displaced Syrians in Lebanon have worsened over the years and have further deteriorated with the economic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The lack of recognition of refugee status & legal documentation, restrictions on mobility & labour, random placement of curfews, and lack of designated camps to shelter the mass of displaced

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[2] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria

Syrians have made it extremely hard for them to cope. Around 80% of displaced Syrians reside in residential and non-residential shelters in urban and rural areas, while 20% live in Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) set on private lands due to the GoL's strict no-camp policy (VASyR, 2019). However, almost half of the displaced Syrians in non-residential urban shelters and the majority in ITS have inadequate shelter conditions, such as unsealed doors and windows, open roofs, low-quality building materials, water leakages, lack of sewage drainage systems, and the like (LCRP, 2019). This is the case, although the ITS often receive assistance from humanitarian organisations (that varies from consistent to fragmented aid) and is supported by LCRP actors. At the same time, displaced Syrians in more urban areas fall under the jurisdiction of their respective municipality, are more scattered, and are harder to locate by humanitarian organisations (UN-Habitat, 2020). When studying the geographic settlement pattern of displaced Syrians in Lebanon, Kuscevic & Radmard (2020) found that districts with a high number of displaced Syrians were surrounded by districts with low levels of displaced Syrians, a spatial pattern that could be explained by access to credit (most likely from other displaced Syrians) among other reasons. This signifies the importance of informal support displaced Syrians offer each other, often choosing their place of residence accordingly.

It's estimated that at least 73% of displaced Syrians live beneath the national poverty line, and 90% of households will be in debt in 2020 (VASyR, 2020; LCRP, 2020). In 2019 only one-third of displaced Syrians had a full-time job, and 13% worked more than one part-time job to make ends meet (VASyR, 2019). Meeting basic daily needs is becoming more complex, whereby 64% of displaced Syrians lost their jobs in 2020, and 24% endured income cuts (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2020). This is echoed in the hardships displaced Syrians face in meeting rent, where 40% were forced to change to more affordable dwellings (often with substandard living conditions), and 25% faced eviction in 2020 (ibid.)

Access to health and education remains challenging for most displaced Syrians, especially those without reliable income or transportation. Since 2018, the main reasons prohibiting access to Primary Health Care (PHC) were transport costs, drugs/tests/treatment, or doctor fees (VASyR, 2019). With the onset of COVID-19 and the deepening of the economic crisis, a study by NRC (2020) showed that financial constraints and lack of legal documentation remained the main barriers displaced Syrians faced in accessing health care services (ibid.). Access to PHC by displaced Syrians dropped from 63% in 2019 to 57% in 2020, while access to hospital care by displaced Syrians dropped from 22% in 2019 to 15% in 2020, according to VASyR (2020), with the cost of treatment being the main barrier to accessing both primary healthcare and hospital care. Access to PHCs is unevenly distributed, and the areas with the least access were Beirut and Mount Lebanon, while the highest was in the North and the Bekaa (VASyR, 2019).

Geography also plays a part in access to education, whereby access to primary school is highest in the South and Akkar governorates, while Beirut hosts the highest enrolment of secondary school goers (VASyR, 2019). The governorates with the lowest enrolment in primary and secondary schools are Bekaa and Baalbek – El Hermel (ibid.). The main barrier to education throughout age groups, similar to health care, is the cost of transportation and education materials. Table 2 compares the percentages of children enrolled in schools of different age groups in 2018, 2019 and 2020 (VASyR, 2020).

	2018	2019	2020
3-5 years old	20%	16%	16%
6-14 years old	67%	67%	67%
15-17years old	23%	22%	29%

Table 2: Percentage of Syrian children enrolled in school in 2018, 2019 and 2020 (VASyR, 2020)

As of March 2020, schools adopted online learning techniques due to the restrictions posed by COVID-19. Of those in school-age 6-17 years old enrolled, only around 35% had access to distance learning, and the rest (65%) had only in-person learning, potentially indicating that they didn't receive any schooling during the school closures. Of the 35% that attended online classes, one third (11.6%) could not follow their online classes, primarily due to lack of or insufficient internet (VASyR, 2020).

2.2.3 Migration aspirations

Before 2015, many Syrians entered Lebanon freely, thinking it would be temporary and they would return or resettle elsewhere. There is lacking data on the migration aspirations of displaced Syrians in that period. However, as the Syrian crisis protracted and Lebanon's economic and socio-political situation continued to deteriorate, many displaced Syrians and Lebanese alike are now seeking emigration. There was an increase in the number of persons emigrating from Lebanon in 2019 compared to previous years and a surge of departures after the Beirut explosion of August 2020 (Sewell, 2020). Nonetheless, displaced Syrians have limited options, with many not returning to Syria due to unsafe conditions and security reasons, and resettlement caters only to a minority [UNHCR reaches out to resettlement candidates, not the other way around]. The remaining option of local integration is farfetched. Not only does the GoL declare Lebanon is not a country of asylum, but a study by the Refugee Protection Watch (2020) found that more than 70% of displaced Syrians are feeling increased pressure to leave the country, fearing how they will be treated by authorities and locals alike. The study also found that 2/3 of returnees to Syria did so out of a lack of livelihood opportunities amidst a deepening economic crisis in Lebanon (ibid.).

2.3 Overview of Development Projects

Lebanon is one of the top ten aid recipient countries in the world (Al Ayoubi, 2018). Since the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, international funding to Lebanon has considerably grown, from 44 million US$ in 2011 to 1.6 billion US$ in 2020 (fig. 2). However, reported funding falls below the yearly financing required. A shortage in funds is echoed in the region, where the endowing of the regional refugee and resilience plan (3RP) that caters to 5 countries neighbouring Syria has experienced a downward trend in funding since it was put forth in 2013 with 73% funded, in contrast to 2020 where only 42% of the plan was funded[3].

Fig. 2. Trends in reported funding into Lebanon from 2010-2020. *Retrieved from: Financial Tracking Service - OCHA, June 2021.*

In 2015, a specific strategic plan was developed to integrate humanitarian and development needs related to the Syrian crisis. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) is a joint plan between the Government of Lebanon and its international and national partners for the response to the Syrians displaced in the country. It is led by the Ministry of Social Affairs for the Government of Lebanon and is co-led by UNHCR and UNDP. Approximately 160 partners, encompassing Lebanese Ministries, UN agencies and international and local NGOs – are partner to the plan. Within the plan (fig. 3), sectoral operational response plans are outlined, covering: basic assistance, education, energy, food security and agriculture, health, livelihoods, protection, shelter, social stability and water (Hendow, 2019). The LCRP[4] required 2.75 billion US$ in funds to support almost 3.3 million[5] persons in need in 2017, but only $1.1 billion US$ was received.

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[3] Retrieved from the Financial Tracking Service-OCHA, https://fts.unocha.org/

[4] LCRP is the Lebanon chapter of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)

[5] Out of 3.3 million persons in need, 2.8 million were targeted, constituting: 1.5 million displaced Syrians, 1 million vulnerable Lebanese, and 290,000 Palestinian refugees (LCRP, 2017).

Fig. 3. Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2021 Strategic Objectives. *Retrieved from: LCRP, 2021 update*

Several international humanitarian organisations and partners have mobilised to secure humanitarian aid and support development programs in Syria and its neighbouring countries, especially as the crisis protracted. The USAID's Food for Peace has provided more than $3 billion in humanitarian assistance to the Syrian crisis, of which Lebanon has received $616 million (CDCS-USAID, 2020). The EU and its member states are the main international aid providers for the Syrian crisis, mobilizing more than €24.9 billion to date (European Commission, 2020a). The EU has allocated around €2.4 billion in funds since 2011 in Lebanon, including €400 million in bilateral assistance[6]. These funds have been mainly channelled through the EU Regional Trust Fund (EUTF), and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in charge of bilateral assistance. One of the main purposes of the EUTF, which builds upon the EU-Lebanon Compact agreement (2016-2020) and delivers pledges made at the London Conference in 2016 and the Brussels Conferences (2017/18/19/20), is to bridge the humanitarian-development nexus, by focusing on educational, social, health, and economic sectors. It aims to protect the most vulnerable (Lebanese and Syrians) by meeting their most pressing humanitarian needs, ensuring decent living conditions & access to basic services, advocating job creation and economic growth through access to education, and reinforcing the capacities of institutions in charge of responding to the Syrian crisis, including upgrading of infrastructure to meet pressing needs. 60% of EU humanitarian aid is provided in the form of multi-purpose cash assistance, while the remaining 40% addresses emergencies, critical needs and protection services, and non-formal education (European Commission, 2020b). At the Paris CEDRE Conference held in 2018, the EU announced an aid package to support the revitalization of the Lebanese economy, however, it was not mobilized due to the lack of progress in reforms.

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[6] https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/lebanon_en

2.3.1 Development Sectors

In Lebanon, the 2020 appeal received 63% of its target, representing the highest coverage since 2017, where a total of 2.7 million people were reached – 48% Syrians, 46% Lebanese, and 6% Palestinians (3RP, 2020). Figure 4 shows funding received in 8 sectors throughout the period of 2018-2020. Development programs, platforms, and aid assistance in each sector are briefly overviewed in the section below. The sectors facing major obstacles and shortages in funding are shelter, livelihoods, and basic assistance (ibid.).

Fig. 4. Funding received by sector in the period of 2018 to 2020. *Data compiled from 3RP (2018, 2019, 2020)*

Figure 5 shows target and requirements by sector for 2021 based on the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan. Livelihoods is not part of social stability and energy appears for the first time as a sector requiring funds.

Fig. 5. Funding required by sector for 2021. *Data retrieved from LCRP 2017-2021 (2021 update)*

Basic Assistance/Needs: The protracted nature of the Syrian crisis required a transition from the initial emergency type of humanitarian response to a development-oriented, long-term

response, which necessitated coordination between the multiple humanitarian actors on the ground. Accordingly, in 2016, the Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organisational System for E-card (LOUISE) platform was launched, to coordinate sectoral and multi-sectoral Cash and Voucher Assistance[7]. However, according to VaSYR (2019), almost 55% of displaced Syrians are severely vulnerable, out of which only 20% received the necessary assistance in 2019. Furthermore, amidst multiple crises in 2020, almost 9 out of 10 Syrian households lived under extreme poverty, while nearly 50% of Syrian HH received MPCA (UNCHR, 2020a).

At the national level, the EU supports the MoSA (Ministry of Social Affairs) in establishing a national social assistance system. It continues the third-party monitoring system for the MPCA program through the CaMEALeon consortium (bid.). Social assistance by the EU targets both vulnerable Syrians through 100% multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA) and vulnerable Lebanese under the National Program Targeting Poverty (NPTP) through cash, vouchers, and e-cards. Almost 70% of Syrian households (HH) possess a common card that can be used in one of the 500 local shops as part of the WFP program, an implementing partner of the EUTF social assistance action. In 2019, WFP successfully assisted 650,000 displaced Syrians through monthly aid and refugees from other nationalities and vulnerable Lebanese (WFP, 2019). MPCA was found to be the most successful aid apparatus as it allows for freedom of choice with the allocation of funds. Moreover, long-term MPCA was found to improve food security, diet quality and had a generally positive impact versus those receiving short-term or no MPCA at all (Jamaluddine et al., 2020). Lehmann and Masterson (2020) found that humanitarian aid allows displaced Syrians to contribute to the local community through demand for supplies and food, decreasing potential anti-refugee violence.

In 2018-2020, funding for basic assistance never met yearly targets, falling more than 50% short (table 3). A recent newsletter article (Azhari, 2021) exposed the documented losses of almost $250 million from the LOUISE, WFP, and UNRWA aid programs and platforms since October 2019 due to banks swallowing funds as a result of currency conversion. The issuance of aid through dollars or Lebanese Liras is also one of the hiccups holding up the $246 million world bank loan to help Lebanon's most impoverished families (Sewell & Tamo, 2021). Approved in January 2021 and initially intended to reach the target population by May 2021 or even earlier, the loan faced delays due to unapproved changes made by the Parliament and ministers (ibid.). The loan is now expected to reach the poorest no earlier than August 2021. However, prices for basic necessities are skyrocketing and the government's capacity to maintain subsidies on essential imports is shrinking (ibid.).

Health & Nutrition: Access to health remains highly challenging in Lebanon, as the sector is highly privatised. EUTF support to the health sector aims to increase the affordability and quality of health services and supports boosting the capacities of primary and secondary health sectors. People in need are supported by Social Development Centers, which operate along with Primary Healthcare Centre's under the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). The EU is the largest donor in the health sector and has initiated the program to "Reducing Economic Barriers to Accessing Health Services in Lebanon'', with an emphasis on primary health care, community, and mental health services. Through WHO Lebanon, the EUTF supports the provision of chronic medications and access to essential medications for vulnerable Syrians & Lebanese since 2018. UNICEF and the MoPH also initiated a program to provide free

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[7] This includes WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF that can now transfer funds to displaced Syrians using one common e-card.

vaccination services to all children in Lebanon. Table 3 shows that although the health sector received 65% of its target funding in 2020, the number of people reached is only 30% of the yearly target.

Education: The EU has allocated over €200 million to support access to formal and informal education by Lebanese and displaced Syrians. The EU has also diligently worked to enhance the Ministry of Education and Higher Education capacities through public schools, preschool activities, and youth programmes. Funds have also been allocated to rehabilitate schools, teacher training, awareness-raising, and provision of supplies & access to transportation. In addition, the EU supports the "Reaching All Children in Education" (RACE) initiative and enhances systems for child protection services. Despite increased enrolment rates in 2018-2019 with respect to previous years, 44% of compulsory school-aged refugee children (6-14-year-old) don't receive a formal education, while 36% don't receive any type of learning (VASyR, 2020). With increasing poverty rates, labour prevented 25% of youth aged between 15-17 from accessing school, while it prevented 6% of the youth aged 6-14 (ibid.). In 2020, the education sector received 57% of its target funds and reached 90% of its target population (table 3). Nonetheless, the targeted population (552,000) is less than half of the people in need of education (1.2m), perhaps signatory of the incapacity of LCRP actors in reaching or accessing people in need. Projects such as 'Back to the Future' aim to provide a protective and nurturing environment for vulnerable local and refugee children, as well as extracurricular activities and referral activities of children in need of special services. The project is also concerned with upgrading public schools and learning centres across Lebanon. Other initiatives include HOPES-LEB (2016-2020), enabled by the EUTF-Madad fund, aiming to provide better access and quality to further and higher education opportunities for post-secondary age refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The fund provides full academic scholarships at bachelor's and master's levels, academic counselling, study skills and English language courses, and short-term education project funding.

Protection: The protection sector encompasses general protection, child protection, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). It includes legal assistance services regarding legal stay, entailing counselling, representation, civil, birth, and marriage registration. It also encompasses outreach to people of concern, including individual counselling and psychosocial support. Humanitarian actors carry out SGBV prevention and awareness activities and caregiver and children-centred protection services and programmes. From 2018 till 2020, the protection sector has received almost the entirety of its yearly target, yet the number of people in need remains lower than those targeted by LCRP actors (table 3). A EUTF-MADAD fund helped launch the Medair program (2018-2021), which aims to strengthen the well-being and resilience of vulnerable populations in the Bekaa Valley affected by the Syrian crisis through raising awareness and holding discussions about healthy family relations and general well-being.

WASH: Water, sanitation, and hygiene experienced a sharp rise in funding in 2020 along with the COVID-19 pandemic (figure 3). Due to a lack of LCRP data in 2020, figures in 2019 show that 56% of needed funds were received, while 60% of persons targeted were reached (table 3). The main aim of development projects in this sector is to provide access to sufficient and safe water for drinking and domestic use, with less health and environmental impacts through increased wastewater management. UNICEF is the largest provider of WASH services in

Informal Settlements (IS) in partnership with NGOs, reaching more than 80% of 4,100 IS daily[8]. Nonetheless, a study along the Lebanese territory showed that in IS, safely managed drinking water services were much lower than in other shelter types due to the high risk of contamination, and less access to improved water sources (WHO-UNICEF, 2016).

WASH programs have been operating through the EUTF-Madad fund, headed by UNICEF in partnership with the Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water, working with water establishments in the North, South, and Bekaa Valley. Other initiatives include the H2ALL project in Ali El Nahri town and the SABIL consortium, headed by ACTED to promote urban rainwater harvesting as an alternative water source.

Livelihoods and Social Stability: Livelihoods programs aim to stimulate economic development, create income-generating opportunities, improve employability, as well as strengthen policy development and environments for job creation. Nonetheless, the livelihoods sector has suffered from deep underfunding, with 16% funded in 2018 and 24% in 2020 (table 3). Since 2013, the Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme (LHSP) has operated jointly with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), to coordinate a durable response to the impact of the Syrian crisis, build abilities of host communities, address tensions, and prevent conflict through livelihood improvement and service provision. The program is fully integrated into the framework of the LCRP 2017-2020, also developed under the framework of the UNDP response, and targets the most impoverished communities with a higher risk of tension. The International Labour Organization (ILO), in partnership with UNDP, the ministry of labour (MoL), and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) launched the first Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme (EIIP), which aims to provide more jobs in infrastructure projects for Lebanese and Syrians. It aims to increase access to decent employment, improve infrastructure in Lebanon and capacities of contractors and the government, and support the Ministry of Labour in carrying out speedy and transparent work permits for labourers (ILO, 2018a). ILO also initiated 'The No Lost Generation' program in coordination with UNICEF and other partners to ensure access to quality education, child protection, and engaging activities and opportunities for adolescents and youth affected by the Syrian and Iraqi crisis (ILO, 2018b). To eradicate child labour in Lebanon, ILO operates within the National Action Plan to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labour launched in 2013 and with the National Steering Committee against Child Labour and the Child Labour Unit at the MoL (ibid.). Accordingly, they conducted the first study of its kind to determine the magnitude and characteristics of children working on the street (ibid.) On the other hand, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) launched the project "Enhancing resilient livelihoods and food security of host communities and Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon through the promotion of sustainable agricultural development", in partnership with IFAD and WFP, and with the Ministry of Agriculture (under the EU-Madad fund). It aims to create agricultural production support systems, improve agricultural farm productivity and farmers' incomes, and create job opportunities (FAO, 2020).

Social stability has received an average of 50% funding in the years 2018-2020 (table 3). Several programs have been targeting and operating under the social stability sector, including the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) for Lebanon (2018-2019), which support basic need provision and social safety net establishment through long-term poverty alleviation. The Economic Fund for Social Development (ESDF), part of the Euro-Med

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[8] https://www.unicef.org/lebanon/water-sanitation-and-hygiene-program

Partnership (established between EC and Republic of Lebanon), was established in 2000 dedicated to alleviating poverty through job creation and improving living conditions. It has put forth several development projects, including a local development programme along the Litani River Basin, recovery of the local economy, boosting economic growth and job creation, and post 2006 war recovery (ESDF, 2019). The National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP), launched in 2011, is the first poverty-targeted social assistance program in Lebanon that aids vulnerable households. It operates under the MoSA and the presidency of the council of ministers (PCM).

Food security and agriculture: The purpose of this sector is to promote food availability, food accessibility, food utilization and stabilization. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan activities include cash-based assistance, employability skills training in agriculture, literacy, and numeracy for youth. Funding towards this sector has been able to reach more than 100% of its target population. The Lebanon Country Programming Framework (CPF) 2016-2019 addresses the Ministry of Agriculture's (MoA) strategy and the LCRP strategic response plan set in 2016. It aimed to expand economic and livelihood opportunities and improve the agricultural sector's performance contributing to sustainable rural development. The Lebanon Humanitarian Fund is a pooled fund led by OCHA. Since 2014, the fund supports accountable and effective humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable in Lebanon.

Shelter: Shelter is an underfunded sector in Lebanon (fig. 3); it's co-led by the MoSA and UNHCR. Since 2016, funding as a percentage of this sector's appeal has been decreasing (LCRP, 2019). In 2019, the shelter sector reached only 13% of its target, increasing to 20% in 2020 (table 3). This underfunding is strongly felt by the majority of displaced Syrians who are located between the urban fabric and are therefore harder to reach by humanitarian actors. Post the August 2020 Beirut Port explosion, the shelter was the main recipient sector of the Lebanon 2020 Flash Appeal funding. Those funds were channelled through international and national NGOs, such as Caritas, the Rene Mouawad Foundation, Basmeh and Zeitouneh, UNHCR/UN-Habitat, WFP, and others, who provided aid and relief to those affected by the explosion. Since 2012, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) through the Occupancy Free of Charge (OFC) program, provides a minimum of 12-month rent-free housing for Syrian refugees, and it is also involved in the rehabilitation of schools and informal shelters (NRC, 2018). The outcome of this programme resulted in the alleviation of rental pressures of

	2018			2019			2020		
BASIC ASSISTANCE	# of people in need	Target	Reached* (% of target)	# of people in need	Target	Reached (% of target)	# of people in need	Target	Reached (% of target)
Funding ($)		542 million	220 million (41%)		477 million	219m (45%)		495 million	196.4m (40%)
# of people	2.2 million	1.35 million	908,000 (67%)	1.4 million	1.02 million	1.16 million (114%)	1.53 million	1.08 million	1.35 m (70%)
SOCIAL STABILITY									
Funding ($)		110 million	62 million (56%)		125 million	69 million (54%)		126 million	52.4 million (41%)
# of people	NA	NA	NA	251 communities	251 communities	242 communities**	2.16 million	N/A	1.0 million(38%)
HEALTH									
Funding ($)		290 million	144 million (50%)		268 million	143.6 million (54%)		275.9 million	179.5 million (65%)
# of people	2.4 million	1.56 million	905,746 (58%)	2.4 million	1.6 million	905746 (57%)	2.7m	1.89 million	777,000 (29%)
LIVELIHOODS									
Funding ($)		208million	33.2million (16%)		214 million	120 million (56%)		275 million	61.8 million(24%)
# of people	182,169	60,663	55,987 (92%)	171, 183	49,662	57,753 (116%)	202,359	92,035	28,325 (31%)
WATER SECTOR									
Funding ($)		250 million	102 million (41%)		214 million	119.3 million (56%)		212 million	149.3 million (70%)
# of people	3.74	1.56 million	738,403 (47%)	2.69 million	1.39 million	828,084 (60%)	2.69 million	1.27 million	1.78 million (129%)
PROTECTION									
Funding ($)		171.6 million	161 million (94%)		174.1 million	188.5 million (108%)		174.1 million	179.7 million (103%)
# of people	3.2 million	1.89 million	1.32 million (70%)	3.2 million	1.89 million	1.88 million (100%)	3.2 million	1.89 million	N/A
FOOD SECURITY & AGRICULTURE									
Funding ($)		507 million	299 million (59%)		509 million	309 million (60%)		510 million	380 million (75%)
# of people	2 million	921,000	1.0 million (109%)	2 million	1.02 million	1.03 million (100%)	2 million	1.1 million	1.5 million (136%)
SHELTER									
Funding ($)		N/A	N/A		157million	22 million (14%)		156 million	30.6 million (20%)
# of people	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.36 million	694,390	209200 (30%)	1.4 million	666,352	212,105 (32%)
EDUCATION									
Funding ($)		366 million	272 million (74%)		381 million	251 million (66%)		351 million	200 m (57%)
# of people	1.1 million	533000	508,000 (95%)	1.2 million	575,000	509,000 (89%)	1.2 million	551,950	497,119 (90%)

* Reached (received amount) doesn't include yearly carry-over funds

** Inter-Agency Coordination includes *communitiies* rather than *people in their assessment*

Table 3. Funding in 9 sectors in 2018, 2019, and 2020, showing target and received funds, people in need per sector, targeted population, and reached population. *Data compiled using end of year Inter-Agency Coordination dashboards.*

displaced Syrians, strengthening the relationship between tenants and landlords, and providing rental security (although temporary) (IFI, 2019).

2.3.2 Development Mechanisms in Survey Instruments

The type of development intervention encompassing formal and informal support and assistance is assessed in both the qualitative and quantitative survey instruments. The qualitative survey delves deeper into the organisations offering this support, the length of the programmes they took part in, eligibility, expectations of recipients and whether they were met, and the effects of these interventions on the quality of life of displaced Syrians.

The results section will provide more details on the development interventions experienced by respondents.

3. Methodology

Context and Background: In the past two years, Lebanon has struggled with compounded crises that determined a dramatic collapse. The economic crisis, political unrest, the Beirut port explosion, and the COVID-19 pandemic have caused structural vulnerability and increased poverty. The singularity of conditions the country is passing through since October 2019 has conditioned our methodological choice and the interview process. Indeed Syrians are less keen to respond to planned surveys, and in several cases, they are evicted or treated. These delayed our research and determined a decrease in the number of participants.

This work relies on qualitative in-depth phone interviews, quantitative phone surveys, a secondary literature review, and first-hand field knowledge.

The sampling process is based on a case study approach that the AUB team used for the same research project in WP4. Two case studies have been profiled, Bar Elias and Saadnayel in Zahle, the Bekaa Governate's capital city, and the coastal city of Saida, South of Beirut. In Zahle, Bekaa, the main typology of accommodation is the Informal Tented Settlements (fig. 7), while in Saida, the main typologies are residential and non-residential shelters, with some ITS. The selection of the areas depended on data availability due to research conducted in past years by the project's principal investigator and by the easy accessibility to the settlements due to contact on the ground. In Saida, we initially targeted displaced Syrians in a collective urban shelter (the Ouzai shelter). However, throughout our data collection, we learned that in October 2020, displaced Syrians were evicted from the shelter and are now dispersed throughout the city and in other country locations. The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in Lebanon facilitated the participant recruitment process, providing us with the contact of focal points in the study areas. The focal points put us in contact with inhabitants in the informal settlements. Target participants are displaced Syrians older than 18 years residing in Bar Elias and Saadnayel in Zahle, and the Ouzai shelter (displaced Syrians were evicted from this shelter by October 2020) in Saida (fig. 6).

The secondary data analysis relies on a desk study, and reviews of academic literature, including published work and dissertations, official government documents, and 'grey literature' from the inter-and non-governmental sector that were consulted and cited were relevant for factual background.

Fig. 6. Location of study sites, Saida and Zahle and their comparison with the LCRP 2021 map of the most vulnerable Cadasters

Fig. 7. Informal Tented Settlement in Bar Elias.

3.1 Survey Methodology

3.1.1 Survey Piloting and Implementation

The quantitative surveys were conducted between February and July 2021, and each interview lasted approximately 40 - 45 minutes. All interviews followed the interview guidelines drafted by the University of Maastricht. Before the phone interviews, the interlocutors were briefed on the project's objectives, and an information letter was read to all interlocutors, who then provided oral consent to participate. It is important to note that access to the ITSs was not authorised due to the COVID-19 restriction measures put in place in the country. Therefore, the American University of Beirut's Institutional Review Board[9] office granted us the approval to conduct online or phone interviews. Moreover, a total of 185 surveys (table 4) were carried out. A balance between male and female participants and between participants in each case study location was targeted. This proved challenging to achieve in Bekaa versus Saida where the target participants previously resided in a communal shelter, and participant recruitment over the phone was more efficient.

	Bekaa	Saida	Total
Males	42	63	105
Females	25	55	80
Total	67	118	185

Table 4. Distribution of quantitative surveys amongst location and gender.

3.1.2 Survey Questionnaire

The quantitative survey instrument has ten sections (see Appendix I). It delves into the following subject areas: basic information, employment status, migration history, migration aspirations, development intervention policies, risk attitude, household characteristics, household network, access and assets, and well-being.

The survey instrument includes a background overview on participants' personal history, such as place of birth, level of education, the number of people and children in the household (HH), number of working members in HH, and in the case they had children, whether they had attended school in the past month. Also, their current employment status, legal status, tenure status of dwelling, main sources of income, possession of home appliances, and internet access at home or through the mobile phone were assessed.

Then, migration histories, such as routes, means of travel, and travel experiences, were recorded. This includes migration preferences, such as the will to stay, leave to a third country, or return to their country of origin; as well as means and reasons for seeking onward

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[9] The Human Research Protection Program (HRPP) at AUB is responsible to safeguard the rights and welfare of human subjects participating in Biomedical and Social and Behavioral Sciences (SBS) research activities conducted under the auspices of AUB/AUBMC. The IRB, that is the core component of HRPP, is the committee formally designated by HRPP to review and approve the conduct of research involving human subjects who are recruited to participate in research activities conducted at AUB/AUBMC and/or by AUB/AUBMC faculty, students and staff, regardless of the funding source or the location of the research.

migration. Participants were asked about the presence of relatives outside of their country of asylum and country of origin. Moreover, the effect of COVID-19 on migration plans, employment, and finances was recorded. A focus on development interventions included questions on whether they had received aid or remittances in the past 12 months or received development aid such as training or counselling services. Finally, participants were asked to rate their satisfaction with their current living conditions, access to health services, employment opportunities, and access to education. They were also inquired about their future expectations, relationship with the local community, and perception of COVID-19 risk globally, in the country, and within their family.

The survey was based on and adapted from the main overall study survey across the different countries. Some adjustments were made to adapt to the local context and conditions. The survey was also adjusted to suit the American University of Beirut's Institutional Review Board's (IRB) recommendations by removing sensitive words or any descriptive experiences that would in any way harm the respondents.

3.1.3 Data Analysis

The descriptive analyses of the quantitative questionnaire results were conducted using SPSS.25 software (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 25), and categorical variables were reported in a numerical manner. Because the data and participants' security were paramount, all data was stored on encrypted computers accessible only to the researchers.

3.1.4 Methodology Limitations

The original methodology assigned to the ADMIGOV WP6 program was face-to-face interviews. However, due to COVID-19 restrictions, remote interviews were chosen as the best alternative. The limitations encountered while conducting remote surveys are listed below:

1. Time limitations: The interviews took longer than initially planned since multiple-choice answers on the phone proved difficult. Also, participants would often share or delve deeper into the responses to explain their situation. Besides, despite this quantitative being a questionnaire with a single choice, participants prefer to take their time explaining a few points to tell a few stories to back up their case. Signal issues were faced by participants in the Bekaa area, often leading to the need for several repetitions.
2. Many participants were hesitant to answer whether they had in fact received remittances in the past 12 months, possibly fearing they wouldn't be eligible for future remittances.
3. Internet limitations: some participants agreed to be interviewed over WhatsApp. This was a challenge, given the bad internet connection for both parties.
4. Other phone usages: Some participants weren't able to stay longer over the phone since their kids were using the same instrument for online learning.
5. Scheduling issues: participants have a hassling life schedule. Sometimes, they would often forget about a scheduled survey, and the interviewer would either set another date and time or directly proceed with the interview.

3.2 Qualitative Interview Methodology

3.2.1 Survey Piloting and Implementation

The qualitative surveys were carried out between April and May 2021 in Saida and the Bekaa Valley. A total of 30 interviews (table 5), as sampling from the quantitative, were conducted, maintaining a balance between males and females in both study areas. The interviews, which lasted approximately 25 minutes, were conducted in Arabic, the participants' preferred language. Notes were taken during the phone surveys, and an Arabic template was transcribed to document participants' responses, using interview recordings to fill out any missing or unclear information. The interviews were then checked, cleaned, and translated to English.

	Bekaa	Saida	Total
Males	8	8	16
Females	7	7	14
Total	15	15	30

Table 5. Distribution of qualitative interviews amongst location and gender.

3.2.2 Qualitative Interview Instrument

The qualitative interview features 29 questions divided into seven main sections (see Appendix II), related to the current conditions of displaced Syrians, the development interventions, plans to stay/migrate, factors in the decision to stay/migrate, migration decision-making processes, and future plans. The qualitative survey includes open-ended questions, allowing respondents to delve deeper into explaining their views and situation if they wish.

3.2.3 Data Analysis

The qualitative data were analysed using the QRS NVivo 12 Software, a qualitative data interpretation and analysis tool. All interviews were recorded, then transcribed and coded. After completing the coding, NVivo was used to perform the queries for each code and then stratified by respondents to extract code-specific data. Then, code-specific extracts were retrieved, evaluated, and summarised into code summary memos. Because the data and participants' security was paramount, all data was stored on encrypted computers accessible only to the researchers in accordance with the ADMIGOV Data Management plan and ethics procedures.

3.2.4 Methodology Limitations

The original methodology assigned to the ADMIGOV WP6 program was face-to-face interviews. However, due to COVID-19 restrictions, remote interviews were chosen as the

best alternative. The limitations encountered while conducting remote interviews are listed below:

1. Time limitations: Interviews were taking longer to conduct. Sometimes the participants couldn't hear the question properly, and the interviewer would have to repeat it multiple times. Signal issues were encountered with participants in the Bekaa location.
2. Internet limitations: some participants agreed to be interviewed over WhatsApp. This was a challenge, given the poor internet connection for both parties.
3. Multiple phone users: some participants stated that they don't have a lot of time to spend on the interview since their kids were using the phone for online learning.
4. Scheduling issues: some participants were busy, often forgetting a scheduled interview. therefore we had to reschedule it.

4. Results

For many displaced Syrians, specifically, participants of the qualitative interviews, development interventions and aid assistance were necessary for survival. Yet, the vast majority (90%) of participants claimed that development interventions didn't meet their expectations, while 60% claimed that their quality of life wasn't enhanced. They declared that financial assistance wasn't enough to meet their needs and perceived the lack of help with migration services as a negative factor. Moreover, the lack of development projects in health and education services was the main reason participants wished to travel abroad. A common notion shared by interviewees was the lack of a future for them or their children in this country.

> *"I want to travel because my kids don't have a future here, either we travel, and they live a good life, or they will become beggars on the street."*

The results section below is thematically organised, summarising survey data. The qualitative interviews provide more depth on the survey data and explain case examples.

4.1 Descriptive Profile of Respondents

4.1.1 Questionnaire Respondents

	Group 1, Bekaa (n=67)		Group 2, Saida (n=118)		Total (n=185)
Respondent Household Head	49		72		121
Sex	Females	25	Females	56	81
	Males	42	Males	62	104
Highest Level of Education Achieved	No formal education	14	No formal education	25	39
	Primary School	37	Primary School	58	95
	Secondary School	8	Secondary School	23	31
	Intermediate School	2	Intermediate School	5	7
	High School Diploma/Certificate	2	High School Diploma/Certificate	4	6
	Bachelor	5	Bachelor	2	7
	Masters	0	Masters	3	3
Children Attending School in Household	46 households have children attending school		81 households have children attending school		127
Employed	23		44		67

Home ownership in Syria	52	62	114

Table 6: Descriptive Profile of Questionnaire Respondents.

The quantitative survey questionnaire was conducted with 185 displaced Syrians residing in Bekaa and Saida. As Table 6 shows, most respondents were the head of the households or the household head's spouse. A minority of 36% of participants were employed. The majority of those unemployed communicated that COVID-19 was a main obstacle in finding a job, followed by a lack of work opportunities and disability or chronic illness. On the other hand, 22% were illiterate, and the majority (51%) had only attended primary school, followed by those with no formal education (21%). 127 households responded that their children were attending school; however, the most prevalent reason for not attending school was a lack of financial resources, followed by covid-19, the age of children, schools being at full capacity, and finally because of an illness or disability.

Back in Syria, the majority (87%) of respondents lived in rural areas. Most were previously employed as farmers/fishermen, followed by those that were employers or working on their own account, and a small percentage were students and daily labourers. Upon leaving Syria, most did so with their current household members, and 98% of participants intended to arrive in the Middle East after leaving Syria. Almost all respondents (97%) arrived in Lebanon by vehicle, while 5% arrived on foot and one per cent by flight. However, 15% of respondents experienced threats during their migration journey, possibly including gunshots, robbery, lack of goods, and other similar threats. Although 96% of respondents were registered as refugees, only 3% of respondents experienced recruitment attempts for onward migration, and 2% of the participants had previously attempted to leave Lebanon.

The quantitative analysis findings showed that most participants lived in rural areas in Syria, and most were farmers/fishermen, followed by own-account workers, students, and daily labourers. Most left Syria with their household members and intended to arrive at a location in the Middle East. Almost all respondents arrived by vehicle, while a few made it on foot. However, around 15% experienced threats during their migration journey. Most of them are now renting their houses, with a minority squatting on communal and private land.

4.1.2. Qualitative Interview Respondents

The qualitative respondents, as a follow-up from the quantitative, offered more insights into migration aspiration. Qualitative interviews were conducted with 30 displaced Syrians from both Saida and Beqaa areas in Lebanon. They included 14 females and 16 males, most of whom are married. Only 8 participants (27%) reported that they are working, while the rest either lost their jobs or were hindered by their medical condition. Furthermore, half of those working have a fixed job, yet the other half struggle to get their daily income, as they don't have a constant job.

> "*I'm a worker, I don't have a fixed job, if I find an opportunity, I would work, if not, I would stay home.*"

Nevertheless, almost all the participants (87%) suffer from hard living conditions exacerbated by the Lebanese economic meltdown and the current political situation. Many displaced

Syrians face hardships in living a dignified life as they have little access to education, food, and medication. A participant shared the following difficulties when arriving in Lebanon:

> "I'm injured from the war in Syria. I was treated there, and I performed 29 surgeries. When I got to Lebanon, all NGOs, even the UN, refused to continue my treatment, and I'm a refugee, I don't have the money to pay for my surgeries. I needed two urgent surgeries at the time because the metal cords inserted in my legs began to rot and needed to be removed urgently. I communicated with a Doctor at the Turkish border with Syria, and I went to him because he agreed to do my surgery at a very low cost. I suffered a lot, and he performed the surgery without anaesthesia. After that, I spent one year in the Turkish camps, I was almost paralysed. I couldn't move and take care of my children. Then, my brothers gathered money and brought it back to Lebanon illegally. My husband was caught in the process, and we didn't know anything about him for long. We heard a while ago that he was executed."

When participants were asked if they feel safe in their neighbourhood, 27% reported that they don't feel safe due to the political unrest and the decreased social security. 73% of respondents feel safe where they live, and most of them have relatives or neighbours that they communicate with regularly.

> "I feel safe in our area, we don't face problems, we've lived in the area for 10 years; we've gotten used to the neighbourhood."

4.2 Migration Aspirations

Migration Aspirations Variable		Bekaa (n=67)	Saida (n=118)	Total (n=185)
D1- Last year considered aspiration	Move	19	63	82 (44%)
	Stay	33	41	74 (40%)
	Return to home country	8	9	17 (9%)
	Don't know	7	5	12 (7%)
D2- Planned Aspiration	Move	26	70	96 (52%)
	Stay	19	18	37 (20%)
	Return to home country	2	2	4 (2%)
	Don't know	20	28	48 (26%)

Table 7. Questionnaire Respondents Migration Aspirations

4.2.1. Onwards Migration Aspirations

Questionnaire Respondents

According to Table 7, 44% of the respondents wished to travel abroad last year, increasing to 52% who planned to move at the time of the questionnaire. Also, the majority of participants wanted to leave within the next year, and all participants wanted to leave with all the members of their families. 45% of those wishing to go abroad intend to go to Europe, 33.3% didn't specify their preference, and 20% wish to migrate to the US/Canada (20%). Almost all participants seeking onward migration think it's possible for them to have refugee status, citizenship, education for their children, and to be employed in their intended destination.

Qualitative Interview Respondents

In the qualitative interviews, 20 out of 30 participants (66.6%) wished to travel abroad, including one respondent who didn't mind either returning to Syria or travelling abroad (the reason being reuniting with family in either location). Two participants claimed to want to travel abroad till the situation permits their return to Syria. The majority (46%) of respondents seeking onward migration claimed the need for a better quality of life and access to services, specifically healthcare and education. Factors affecting their decision to migrate from Lebanon include hyperinflation, poverty, lack of access to healthcare services and education, lack of safety, racism against Syrian refugees, and inability to attain basic needs in life. Hence, they hope to live in a country that embraces them and offers their rudimentary necessities. Another main reason for seeking onward migration is reunification with family members or relatives abroad. Finally, a few participants mentioned not having a residency permit as a factor in their decision-making. In contrast, for others, the lack of benefits of having a residency permit was a reason.

> *"Everything is expensive. My kids need diapers, and I have to eat with 200,000 LBP monthly. This amount is not enough to support a family. I can't enrol my kids in school, and I don't have a Lebanese residency permit. We barely eat. We cannot live like that anymore."*

> *"My health condition is what pushed me to consider travelling. I don't have access to healthcare services here, either for me or for my kids. I want my kids to learn and work."*

4.2.2. Aspiration to Stay

Questionnaire Respondents

According to table 7, 40% of the respondents wished to stay in Lebanon last year, decreasing to 20% who planned to stay at the time of the questionnaire. When asked about the main conditions that could affect the decision to stay, almost all participants in the Bekaa and Saida claimed that education opportunities were very important. Other reasons in order of decreasing importance are the absence of armed conflict in the area, reunification with family/friends, lower level of crime, violence, and insecurity, COVID-19, better employment opportunities, good social assistance, health policies, and access to aid.

Qualitative Interview Respondents

In the qualitative interviews, 9 out of 30 participants (30%) shared that they want to stay in Lebanon, out of which four want to stay till the situation is better in Syria and they can

return. The main reasons behind wanting to stay are lack of funds or support for migration, not enough information about migration, single motherhood, fear of illegal travel services, and old age. One participant wished to stay due to access to healthcare and other services. Out of the four participants who want to stay till the situation gets better in Syria, three were working, while all mentioned that they felt safe in Lebanon, that they had their family around, and some mentioned familiarity with the language and culture. It is also worth noting that many of the female participants refuse to leave the country because they do not have companionship, and are either not allowed to do so solo or just cannot bear travelling alone.

> *"We have the same culture as the Lebanese people and speak the same language. I don't want to go to a foreign country different from my religion."*

> *"I'm a female, I can't travel alone. Travelling has its expenses, and I don't have the money. I can't save money from my income to travel. I don't have enough information about migration."*

Furthermore, some of the participants' decisions to stay were influenced by several entities, including advice from relatives (mainly spouses), neighbours, and other displaced Syrians that attempted to travel and encountered complications.

> *"I heard a lot of stories about people that tried to travel by sea, and they died in the process. I felt scared, I don't want to travel and risk my family's life."*

Moreover, as presented in Figure 8, 40% of all respondents who wish to return to Syrian or migrate actually came to Lebanon in 2012. However, 30% of those who want to stay in Lebanon have arrived in 2014.

Fig. 8. Year of entry into Lebanon and migration aspirations of participants in the qualitative interviews.

4.2.3 Aspiration to return

Questionnaire Respondents

According to Table 7, 9% wanted to return to Syria last year, decreasing to 2% that still wished to return at the time of the interview.

Qualitative Interview Respondents

In the qualitative interviews, only 1 participant aspired to return to Syria. The main reason was safety in the place of origin and nostalgia for the land. Having attained a residency permit was a factor in the participant's decision, giving flexibility in entering and leaving Lebanon.

4.3 Development Interventions

		Bekaa (n=67)	Saida (n=118)	Total (n=185)
E2- Development Assistance Received	Yes	63	101	164
	No	4	17	21
E1- Type of Development Assistance Applied For	Education cash transfer/assistance	59	91	150
	Other cash transfer	67	116	183
	Food aid	67	117	184
	Employment training	1	4	5
	Skill Training	0	0	0
	Others	0	0	0
E3- Type of Development Assistance Received	Education cash transfer/assistance	0	0	0
	Other cash transfer	5	12	17
	Food aid	57	86	143
	Employment training	0	0	0
	Skill Training	0	0	0
	Others	1	3	4
E4- Type of Training Received	Language	11	3	14
	Computer skills (MS word, excel and other software)	0	1	1
	Technical skills (Programing/data analysis, project management etc.)	0	1	1
	Operational skills (Financial management, leadership skills, team work, conflict management etc..)	0	1	1
	Agricultural skills	0	0	0
	Business management skills/financial knowledge	0	0	0
	Other skill training for jobs	0	6	6

Table 8: Questionnaire Respondents Participation in Development Interventions

Questionnaire Respondents

In the questionnaire, 164 out of 185 participants (89%) received development assistance, dominantly through food aid (77%) and a few received cash transfer (7%). As table 8 shows,

150 participants applied for education aid/transfer, yet none received any. Also, 5 participants applied for employment training, 14 participants received language training, 6 received other skill training for jobs, 1 received technical skills, and another received operational skills, constituting 12% of the respondents in total (table 8).

Qualitative Interview Respondents

In the qualitative interviews, the majority (90%) of the participants received development interventions (formal and informal support) in the last five years. All were issued by the United Nations (UN) or the Lebanese government. The type of support received was mostly in the sectors of basic assistance through cash, vouchers, e-cards, food security, and health and nutrition (fig. 9). Additionally, few reported having obtained assistance in protection through residency permits and in education. Yet, none reported receiving aid related to livelihoods, social stability, WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene), or shelter. Only 3 out of 30 respondents obtained informal support, especially from their neighbours, as they provide them with food whenever possible. While 3 out of 30 respondents claimed not having received any support whatsoever.

> *"The UN provides us with food aid, a card that we use to buy our groceries, it also covers a percentage of our children's school fees."*

> *"Our neighbours, when they receive boxes of food supplies, give us a share of what they received, and I'm always grateful for them."*

> *"The UN is not helping our family. No one is helping us with hospital fees and medicines."*

Fig. 9. Type of assistance received in the qualitative interviews.

The length of support received from the UN was inconsistent among participating Syrians as some reported its initiation to be synchronous with their arrival to Lebanon, while others had to wait for some time. Also, some participants encountered interruptions in receiving support, without dwelling a lot on the reasons and repercussions.

> *"They started helping me ever since I arrived in Lebanon, but they stopped all support 4 months ago, and that affected my situation a lot."*

Regarding UN development interventions, they did not meet the expectations of most of the participants (90%). They believe the UN needs to provide them with higher financial assistance and help with migration by providing relevant date information and facilitating travelling procedures. Moreover, there were complaints about the lack of health and educational support, as many have chronic diseases but can't afford treatment.

> *"I was expecting the UN to provide me with migration opportunities because many Syrians travelled with the help of the UN. As well as the hospital fees, I have a daughter with a burn on her body, and the UN didn't agree to help me with the hospital fees."*

Even those who issued Lebanese residency permits reported that it did not benefit them in anything.

> *"I have a Lebanese residency permit, with UN sponsorship, but it's not benefiting me in anything, my situation is still bad."*

In addition to the above, 40% of those who received support from the UN declared that it improved their quality of life, and many are thankful since it is the only entity they received assistance from. On the contrary, 60% declared that it did not enhance their quality of life because the amount is insufficient, and they barely afford food. Furthermore, the Lebanese financial crisis aggravated their situation as the assistance was not updated nor adapted to the current economic situation with the Lebanese Lira devaluation.

> *"Yes, it definitely changed my quality of life. Psychologically, I'm doing way better now."*

> *"It didn't change my quality of life. I feel like their support is not enough because everything is expensive now."*

Fig. 10. Gender analysis of Quality of Life (QOL) improvement upon registration as a UN Asylum Seeker in the qualitative interviews.

Risk Attitude of Questionnaire Respondents

Most of the respondents were aware of the risks of migration, where 72% knew about the risks of migration to Europe. 82% of participants were not at all willing to take risks and somewhat not willing to take risks. Also, 93% of respondents shared that they had no control or some control over their lives.

4.4. Other Results of Relevance

4.4.1. Household Characteristics, Access and Assets

79% of participants were renting their houses, while 11% were squatting on community-owned land, and 5% were squatting on privately owned land. 71% of respondents owned a refrigerator, 71% owned an oven, and 20% had no access whatsoever. 59% of respondents owned a washing machine, 32% had no access, and 51% owned a television, while 39% had no access, and 6% shared the asset with other families. Also, 99% of respondents owned a mobile phone, representing the most available asset the participants had. Finally, 42% had no access to a satellite dish, while 39% (the asset with the highest sharing value) shared this amenity, and only 12% had access to a satellite dish.

A minority of participants (4%) received remittances (money or goods from family or friends) in the past 12 months, mostly from Germany, and the rest from Turkey, Lebanon, and Canada. 4 of the 8 participants have not received those remittances post COVID-19 outbreak in Lebanon. Further, 13% said they support family or friends living elsewhere through money or good.

4.4.2. Migration Decision-making Process: Qualitative Interview Respondents

The migration decision-making process of displaced Syrians is challenging in a country like Lebanon, which is in a protracted crisis and suffers from several conflicts. Consequently, the majority (57%) of participants in the qualitative interviews claimed to have changed their initial set plan per the economic and political situations in Lebanon and Syria. Yet, others are open to changing their current plan if needed. For instance, those deciding to return to their home country, Syria, now believe that it's not possible and changed their aspiration to either go abroad or stay in Lebanon to adapt to emerging issues. On the other hand, almost 43% of respondents had already decided and were more fixated on their aspirations.

> "My plans have changed. I can't go back to Syria now; the war destroyed everything in the country. There's no water or electricity, no houses or job opportunities. It's not feasible that I go back."

> "No, I made up my mind. I want to go abroad. Nothing can make me change my mind."

In the bargain, numerous factors affect this decision-making process, which can originate from formal and informal sources. Formal sources include the UN's power to provide and support travelling opportunities. However, most participants complained of never receiving such information from the UN. On the other hand, the majority of participants (77%) were influenced by informal sources of information in the process of decision-making. These include close siblings, relatives, connections, and social media platforms. For example, many displaced Syrians reported having heard stories about people who migrated to other countries, by smuggling through the sea or legally, along with the consequences of each strategy.

> "I heard these stories from people around me and social media. The UN never provided me with information about migration. Yes, I believed them."

> "I trust the stories that I hear from people more than the UN because they lived the experience."

In contrast, five respondents reported not having received any formal and informal sources of information about migration and the risks of travelling at all.

> *"I don't know anyone that travelled. I didn't hear stories, and the UN never provided information about migration."*

Even though the majority (67%) of participants documented the full conscious ability to make their decision; nonetheless, a significant portion of them felt like they don't have a choice and that it is impossible to plan for something with limited resources and a vague future.

> *"I feel like I don't have a choice, I want to return to Syria, but it's not feasible. And I don't want to migrate to another country because I don't have the money. So, my only option is to stay in Lebanon."*

On another note, when participants were asked about what can make them stay in a country, almost all stressed the importance of having access to healthcare services, education, employment opportunities and security. Also, few raised the point of being around family and getting citizenship.

> *"Safety and security. The whole family stays together. My husband finds job opportunities. Access to services, most importantly hospitals and medicines."*

4.4.3. Development Interventions and Migration Aspirations

There is consensus among respondents in the qualitative interviews that there are no development interventions that affected their migration aspirations. On the contrary, the lack of such initiatives urged them to take decisions like leaving Lebanon or even returning to Syria.

> *"No, there haven't been any interventions to change my mind. The living conditions are a factor enough to convince me to leave. It is a permanent decision."*

4.4.4. Future Plans

Qualitative Interview Respondents

None of the respondents prepared themselves for their future except one that managed to connect with an embassy for a visa. The lack of preparation was reflected in a lack of information, access to information, or persons to contact. All participants claimed to need the assistance of the UN in decision-making. Additionally, there were no training programs that any attended for this purpose.

> *"No, because I don't know what to do. I want the UN to facilitate my migration process."*

Furthermore, few (7%) had employment business ambitions such as farming, but the vast majority (93%) don't have any preference. Moreover, only two respondents aimed for family reunification formation (Response ID_4 & 7).

> *"I hope that I can work. I don't have a preference. I can work in anything as long as I secure food for my kids."*

> *"I hope to be reunited with my family and spend the rest of my life with them."*

Finally, when participants were requested to suggest improvements in their quality of life, many urged a decrease in the USD: LBP currency conversion rate, provision of access to basic services, and increased employment opportunities. Moreover, others solicited more organisations to help refugees, while the rest had no hope of a better future for Lebanon.

> *"I don't want to get into politics, but the dollar rate should decrease so people can buy food and live."*

> *"I don't know. The situation is difficult. It's not likely that the situation improves."*

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This research assessed the migrant decision-making process and development interventions of displaced Syrians in Lebanon, specifically in the Bekaa and Saida. This was done using both quantitative and qualitative research methods.

5.1 Migration Aspirations

Almost all participants in the quantitative questionnaire are currently registered as refugees; however, only 3% received recruitment attempts for onward migration. The majority of participants planned to travel abroad in both the qualitative and quantitative assessments. In fact, there was an increase in the number of participants that wished to leave Lebanon in 2021 compared to 2020 and a decrease in those wishing to stay in Lebanon and return to Syria. The main reasons for leaving were those seeking a better quality of life and access to services like education and healthcare, followed by those wishing to reunify with their family or relatives abroad. The main reasons for those wishing to stay included waiting for the situation to subside in Syria, allowing return, lacking funds or information about migration options, illegal travel services, single motherhood, and old age. Considering that a minority of respondents wished to return to Syria in both the qualitative and quantitative assessments, and there was a decrease in those wishing to return in 2020 vs 2021, any discussion or action on return by country officials can be in opposition to displaced Syrians' aspirations, and threaten their safety or well-being.

When comparing last year's migration aspirations with planned aspirations, there was an increase in those that "don't know" their migration plans, and 93% of participants shared that they feel they have no or little control over their life. The qualitative analysis also revealed that many displaced Syrians felt they didn't have a choice regarding their future plans. They felt stuck, given the situation of the country, COVID-19, the situation in Syria, and the lack of information about migration or recruitment processes. This confirms secondary resources whereby displaced Syrians felt stuck in "limbo" (RPW, 2020). The majority of respondents claimed to have changed their travel plans based on the situation in both Lebanon and Syria. Others claimed to rely on second-hand stories and experiences from informal sources (including friends and family) to make their decision about migration, and 73% of respondents in the questionnaire claimed to know about the risks of migration to Europe.

5.2 Development Interventions

On the other hand, the majority of participants in both the qualitative and quantitative surveys had received development interventions including formal and informal support. The type of support received for the qualitative participants was mostly in the sectors of basic assistance through cash, vouchers, e-cards, food security, and health and nutrition. However, 27 out 30 participants in the qualitative survey shared that the assistance didn't meet their expectations, and 18 out of 30 believed that it didn't improve their quality of life. The main criticisms encompassed inadequate financial assistance (considering the devaluation of the Lebanese Lira) especially to meet basic daily needs, lack of aid in education and health services, and lack of aid in migration services or migration information. In the questionnaire, a majority of participants applied for education assistance, yet none was received. On the other hand, the main type of assistance received was food aid (77%), and a minority received aid as cash transfer.

The majority (80%) of respondents in the questionnaire slightly/strongly disagreed that they receive strong support from government authorities. Also, 40% of respondents slightly agreed that they receive strong support from aid organisations in their area. However, 16% strongly disagreed, mostly those residing in Saida, confirming that humanitarian aid and assistance actors may have more difficulty reaching displaced Syrians in urban areas versus those in rural areas. The vast majority agreed that most locals in this area want displaced Syrians to return to their homes, and the majority agreed that their arrival made it more difficult for people in the community to find work.

5.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations

We conclude this research by proposing recommendations according to our findings:

Recommendation 1: on the subject of voluntary return

Fakhoury (2020), and Içduygu & Maissam (2020) suggest that any discussion on return is problematic since the conditions of safety and security aren't guaranteed. Further, any action on repatriation directly threatens displaced Syrians. In Lebanon, the GSD has been returning Syrians since 2017, and there is no measure to monitor whether it has been voluntary, nor is there any way to ensure conditions in Syria are safe. Therefore, a main recommendation is to postpone any discussion or action on return by officials in hosting countries. A second recommendation would be for the UN to set up a system to monitor safety conditions for those willing to voluntarily return.

Recommendation 2: UN assistance in migration services and information

Since the UN approaches candidates for migration resettlement services, the majority of displaced Syrians remain without any knowledge of their options nor receive any information on migration. This was frustrating for many respondents as they felt stuck in Lebanon and felt they had little or no control over their life. Therefore, a main recommendation would be for the UN, IOM, and other resettlement and humanitarian actors to make information on migration readily available to displaced Syrians. This could be done through an Arabic audio or written web page or the like, considering the main asset the majority of respondents had was a mobile phone.

Recommendation 3: Cash assistance to reflect currency devaluation

As the currency in Lebanon devalues, the purchasing power of the Lebanese Lira is much less. Consequently, displaced Syrians find it more difficult to meet daily needs, especially food. Therefore, in case funds reach Lebanon in USD or another foreign currency, they should be given out to displaced Syrians accordingly, which would, in turn, give them more flexibility and purchasing power with their money.

Recommendation 4: Emphasis on education and health services in development interventions

Many of the respondents who wanted to leave and even those "forced to stay" by the situation claimed that they or their children had serious health conditions that needed medical attention, which they weren't receiving. This affected their decision-making. Also, many wished to travel abroad to secure an education for their children. Finally, educational opportunities were the most critical factor in the decision-making of displaced Syrians that want to stay in Lebanon. Therefore, development interventions should focus on these two sectors and try to reach as many displaced Syrians as possible.

Recommendation 5: Communicating with displaced Syrians

As a result of COVID-19, being displaced, tough living conditions in the country, or just human nature, many displaced Syrians interviewed were extremely happy to speak and participate in the research. They felt happy that they could voice their concerns and express their worries, fears, and hopes. Therefore, humanitarian and development actors could contact displaced Syrians, check in with them, ask them about their lives, and offer mental health services when needed.

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Appendix I – WP6 QUESTIONNAIRE

1   Administrative Information

This Module should be answered by the enumerator.

1.1	Country	1 Ethiopia 2 Lebanon 3 Mali 4 Turkey
1.2	Region/ City/ Camp	1 West Bekaa, Saadnayel 2 West Bekaa, Bar Elias 3 Saida, previously lived in Ouzai shelter
1.3	Interviewee	1 Syrian Refugee
1.4	Respondent Sex	1. Male 2. Female

A   Basic Information

- *Household: Your household includes everyone with whom you share an apartment or house and with whom you are also related by birth, marriage, partnership, or adoption.*
- *The household head, he/she, is the one who makes most of the decisions*

A 1	Are you the head of household or main decision maker?	1 Yes → go to A 0 No → go to A 2
A 2	What is your relationship with the head of household or main decision maker?	1 Wife or husband 2 Son or daughter (include adopted) 3 Grandson or granddaughter 4 Niece or nephew 5 Father or mother 6 Brother or sister 7 Son or daughter in law 8 Brother or sister in law 9 Grandfather or grandmother 10 Father or mother in law 11 Other (please specify)
A 3	How old are you?	
A 4	Place of Birth (City/ town &Country)	
A 5	Can you read and write in any language?	1 Yes 0 No
A 6	What is the highest level of education which you have completed so far?	1 No formal education 2 Adult Education 3 Primary school 4 Intermediate 5 Secondary 6 Technical/ vocational post-secondary 7 High school Diploma /Certificate 8 Part of University (Diploma) 9 Bachelor 10 Masters of higher

A7	Are there Children in the household? Have all Children (6-17 years old children) attended school regularly in the last month before the Covid 19 outbreak began (not being absent for more than two weeks in the past month)?	1 Yes 0 No → *go to A8* 88 Don't know or refused to answer
A 8	How many of Children (6-17 years old children) did NOT attend school in the last month (absent over two weeks in the past month)?	Male ..... Female .....
A 9	What are the main reasons that the child/children did not attend school? *Multiple choices is possible*	1 Illness / disability 2 Pregnant 3 Works for income outside the home 4 Do house work / take care of younger siblings 5 Lack of financial resources 6 Parents do not know how to enroll 7 No documents to enroll in schools 8 The school nearby is poor quality 9 Absence of Female teachers 10 Schools / colleges are full and do not accepting new students 11 There are no schools / colleges nearby 12 The way to school / college is not safe 13 No need to go to school 14 Other (please specify)

B   Current Employment Status

B 1	In the last 12 months, did you work for someone else (for at least one hour) for wage, salary, commission, or any payment in kind?	1 Yes 0 No → go to **B4** 99 Refused to respond or not relevant
B 2	How much is the income or per diem per hour that you received from this work? *# local currency*	
B 3	Have you worked since (date of Covid 19 Outbreak in country)	1 Yes 2 No
B 4	During the past 12 months were you looking for a job?	1 yes 0 No → go to **C 1**
B 5	What do you think is the main obstacle that you face in securing a job? *please specify the three main reasons in order of importance: (1- first main reason to 3- third main reason)*	1 Lack of or inadequate skills 2 Lack of experience 3 Lack of family/clan or political connections 4 Disability / chronic illness 5 Ethnic/political or religious discrimination 6 Lack of work opportunities 7 Covid-19 8 Other (please specify)
B 6	What are the main supports you need to secure employment? *please specify the three main reasons in order of importance: (1- first main reason to 3- third main reason)*	1 Technical / Vocational skills training 2 Continue / complete education 3 Securing contacts with locals 4 Securing contacts with employers 5 Securing proper documentation / work permit 6 Securing livestock / tools for agriculture 7 Other (please specify)

C   Migrant/ Refugee Module:

Migration History of Household

Now I would like to ask you some questions regarding the migration history of you and your household:

C 1	Did you live in a Rural, Urban or Suburban place in 'place of origin'?	1 Rural 2 Urban 3 Suburban
C 2	Did you work in 'Place of origin' before leaving there?	1 Yes 0 No

C 3   What was your main activity in 'Place of origin'?

Activities
Work for pay or profit
1. Paid employee: Manufacturing, Construction and Mining & Quarry Industry, Service Trade, broker, wholesale sale & Retail Trade (formal and informal)
2. High skilled position (private consultant, engineer, doctor, university professor)
3. Casual labor/daily laborer
4. Paid apprentice
5. Employer / Own account worker (with or without regular employees)
6. Farming, fishing mainly for sale
Work without pay
7. Farming, fishing mainly for family use
8. Helping in the household/family business
9. Voluntary work/community work
Other activities
10. Student
11. Household duties
12. Self-care (due to disability, injury, illness)
13. Cultural/sports/other recreational activities
14. Retired, pensioner
15. None/does not do anything

C 4	When did you leave the 'place of origin'? *MM/YY*	
C 5	Did you leave Place of origin' with your current household members?	1 Yes 0 No

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C 6	Whom did you leave with? *#multiple answers possible*	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Alone Husband/ wife Father Mother Brother(s) Sister(s) Son(s) Daughter(s) Other relative(s) Friend(s) Other (please specify)
C 7	When you left ' Place of origin' where did you intend to go?	1 2 3 4 5 6	#Country list# Middle East Europe U.S./Canada Africa Other (please specify)
C 8	How did you travel here? *#multiple answers possible*	1 2 3 4 5	By vehicle/ automobile By train Flight Walk Other (please specify)
C 9	Did you experience extortion, gunshot, robbery, lack of good, or other types of similar threats during your migration journey? *#multiple answers possible*	1 1	Yes No
C 10	When did you arrive in the 'current country'? (*MM/YY*)	2	
C 11	With whom did you arrive at this location?	1 2 3	Alone With my family With Friends With a larger group
C 12	What is your current migration status at this location?	1 2 3 4	Registered Refugee Non-registered refugee Visa Other
C 13	Since being in Lebanon has anyone tried to recruit you for onward migration?	1 4	Yes No
C 14	Since being in Lebanon have you tried to leave this country? And How many times	1 2	Yes 0 No – *Go to D1*
C 15	The last time you attempted to leave, which country did you try to enter?		
C 16	What happened in your last attempt while trying to leave this country?		

D   Migration Aspirations

D1	Prior to %Date of Covid 19 outbreak% were you planning to move to another country, or stay in the current country? *or return to Syria?*	1 Move 2 Stay 3 Return to home country 4 Don't know
D2	At the moment are you planning to move to another country, or stay in the current country? *or return to Syria?*	1 Move 2 Stay → *Go to D7* 3 Return to home country → *Skip D5* 4 Don't Know/ Do not have a current plan → *Ask D7*

Onward Migration

D3	When is your plan to move from here?	1 Within next year 2 Within 1 to 2 years 3 Within 3 to 5 years 4 More than 5 years
D4	Do you plan to move with the whole household, alone or only with some members of the household?	1 All the members of the household 2 Alone 3 Me and some members of the household
D5	Which country or region do you plan to move to?	1 #Country list# 2 Middle East 3 Europe 4 U.S./Canada 5 Africa 6 Other (please specify)

D6 Please tell me yes or no for each of the following statements if you think the statement is a possibility for you in the intended destination. Do you think %response category% is possible for you in %intended destination%?:

	Yes	No
1. Refugee status	1	0
2. Employment Opportunities (Being employed or starting own business)	1	0
3. Citizenship	1	0
4. Education for children	1	0
5. Education for myself	1	0
6. Reunification with Family/Friends	1	0

D 7 Thinking about the place where you live now, please tell me yes or no if this factor influences your decision to plan to leave the country:

a- Please specify the three main reasons in order of importance: 1- first main reason to 3- third main reason, and b- Shows the importance of those three on scale 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely important)	1 Yes 2 No
1 Lack of employment opportunities	
2 Lack of educational opportunities for children	
3 Environmental reasons	
4 Armed conflict in the area and the surrounding	
5 High level of crime, violence and insecurity (beside Armed conflicts)	
6 Fear of ethnic/political/religious discrimination and persecutions	
7 Family related reasons	
8 Poor access to health care	
9 Drought/famine/flood	
10 Lack of access to housing/home/land/livestock	
11 Lack of humanitarian assistance (particularly food)	
12 Tensions with the host community	
13 COVID 19	
14 Other reasons (please specify)	

D 8 If you are given the right to live anywhere in Lebanon, where would you like to settle?

1   Rural areas
2   Small town
3   Regional capitals
4   'capital city'
5   Zonal Town
6   Do not want to move from current location
7   Do not want to stay in Lebanon

D 9 If you and the household members get the legal right to work in Lebanon, would you and the household members still want to move to a new country?

1 Yes
0 No

Stay

D 10 Thinking about the place where you live now, I am going to ask you to choose the main conditions that may affect your decision to stay here: please specify the three main reasons in order of importance and also tell me how important they are

a- Please specify the three main reasons in order of importance: 1- first main reason to 3- third main reason, and b- Shows the importance of those three on scale 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely important)	Rank (1 to 3)	Importance level (0 to 10)
1 Better Employment opportunity/ better job earning prospects/ Skills training for job		
2 Education opportunities		
3 Here have good social assistance/ health policies		
4 Access to aid		
5 Absence of Armed conflict in the area and the surrounding areas/ Avoiding ethnic/political/religious discrimination and persecutions		
6 Lower level of crime, violence and insecurity (beside Armed conflicts)		
7 Reunification with family/friends		
8 Language		
9 I want to settle here permanently		
10 I feel I have No other choice		
11 Easy to access		
12 Smuggler chose the country		
13 COVID 19 has made travel too risky		
14 Other reasons (please specify)		

Return

D 11	When do you plan to return?		
		1	Within the next 12 months
		2	Within 1 to 2 years
		3	Within 3 to 5 years
		4	More than 5 years

E Development Intervention Policies

E 1	What types of assistance have you or any members of your household applied for? *#multiple answers possible*	1 Education cash transfer/assistance 2 Other cash transfer 3 food aid 4 Employment training 5 Skill training 6 Others (specify) 7 None
E 2	Have you or any members of your household received any form of assistance from the government, UN organizations, NGOs or any other sources?	1 Yes → *Go to E3* 0 No → *Go to E4*
E 3	What types of assistance have you or any members of your household received?	1 Education cash transfer/assistance 2 Other cash transfer 3 Food aid 4 Employment training 5 Skill training → *go to E4* 6 Others (specify) 7 None
E 4	What kind of training did your household member receive?	1 Language 2 Computer skills (MS word, excel and other software) 3 Technical skills (Programing/data analysis, project management etc.) 4 Operational skills (Financial management, leadership skills, team work, conflict management etc..) 5 Agricultural skills 6 Business management skills 7 Finance knowledge 8 Other skill training for jobs

E 5 Compare to before receiving this 'assistance_title' how has the quality of your life improved?

Not Improved									**Greatly Improved**	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

F Risk Attitude

F 1	How much control do you feel you have over your life?	1 No control 2 Some control 3 A great deal of control 4 Complete control
F 2	Do you know about the risks of migration to Europe via land/sea in %route-title%?	1 Yes 0 No
F 3	Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?	1 Not at all willing to take risks 2 Somewhat not willing to take risks 3 Moderately willing to take risks 4 Somewhat willing to take risks 5 Extremely willing to take risks
F 4	In your opinion, how risky is the migration from current country to Europe?	1 Not risky at all 2 Slightly risky 3 Moderately risky 4 Risky 5 Extremely risky

G   Household Characteristics

G 1 What is the main tenure status of this dwelling?	1 Rented by household 2 Rented and shared with one or more other households 3 Housing provided as part of work 4 Space provided by relatives / friends / host family 5 Temporary shelter arranged by UN/NGOs 6 Squatting on community owned land 7 Squatting on publicly owned land 8 Squatting on privately owned land 9 Other (please specify)	
G2 Do you own a house or land in any country	1 Yes in current country 2 Yes in country or origin 0 No	
G 3 In the past 12 months, did your household receive any remittances (money or goods from family or friends living elsewhere within and outside 'current country')? (This does not include loans)	1 Yes → *go to G4* 0 No → *go to G*	
G4 Have these remittances changed since %date of Covid 19 outbreak%	1 Yes they have stopped 2 Yes they have decreased 3 No they have not changed	
G 5 In which country or region do the family and friends who send the majority of remittances live?		
G 6 Does your household currently support through money or goods, other family or friends living elsewhere? (This does not include loans)	1 Yes 0 No	

H   Household Network

H 1 Do you have any members of this household, relatives and/or friends that live outside of 'current country'?	1 Yes 0 No → *Go to I 1*	
H 2 What is the sex of % networktitle%?	1 Male 2 Female 3 Other	
H 3 What is the current % networktitle%'s country of residence?	1 %country of Origin% 2 Other countries	

I   Access and Asset Section

I 1 For each of the following items, please tick one box to show how you have access to them:

	Own	Share with other families	Have access	Have no access
I1.1 Refrigerator				
I1.2 Dish washer				
I1.3 Oven				
I1.4 Washing Machine				
I1.5 Plasma or LCD Television				
I1.6 Other type of TV				
I1.7 Radio				
I1.8 Air conditioner				
I1.9 Summer house				
I1.10 Automobile				
I1.11 Motorbike				
I1.12 Agriculture tools				
I1.13 Computer or Laptop				
I1.14 Mobile phone				
I1.15 Satellite dish				

I 2 During the past 30 days, did anyone in your household have to do one of the following things because there was not enough money to meet your basic needs?

	Yes	No			Refuse to answer
		I do not need	I already did it (so cannot continue to do it)	I don't have/not possible	
1. Selling household goods (radio, furniture, television, jewelry etc.)	1	2	3	4	99
2. Spent savings	1	2	3	4	99
3. Bought food on credit	1	2	3	4	99
4. Borrowed money	1	2	3	4	99
5. Sell productive assets or means of transport (sewing machine, wheelbarrow, bicycle, car, livestock, etc.)	1	2	3	4	99
6. Reduce essential non-food expenditures such as education, health, etc.	1	2	3	4	99
7. Withdrew children from school	1	2	3	4	99
8. Have children (under 15 years old) involved in income generation	1	2	3	4	99
9. Marriage of children under 15	1	2	3	4	99
10. A household member left/moved elsewhere in Turkey Lebanon due to lack of resources to maintain them	1	2	3	4	99
11. Begged	1	2	3	4	99
12. Sent an adult household member back to %original country% to seek work	1	2	3	4	99

J   Opinions –

Please tell me how much you agree with the following statements:

J 1 Refugees and locals of %current country% in this area have a good relationship with each other.

1 Strongly agree
2 Slightly agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Slightly disagree
5 Strongly disagree

J 2 Refugees receive strong support from government authorities.

1 Strongly agree
2 Slightly agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Slightly disagree
5 Strongly disagree

J 3 Refugees receive strong support from aid organizations in this area.

1 Strongly agree
2 Slightly agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Slightly disagree
5 Strongly disagree

J 4 Most %locals of current country% in this area want refugees to return to their homes.

1 Strongly agree
2 Slightly agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Slightly disagree
5 Strongly disagree

J 5 The arrival of refugees has made it more difficult for people in this community to find work.

1 Strongly agree
2 Slightly agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Slightly disagree
5 Strongly disagree

J 6 The arrival of refugees has brought insecurity to the area.

1 Strongly agree
2 Slightly agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Slightly disagree
5 Strongly disagree

J 7 The arrival of refugees in this area has made it more difficult for people in this community to access services such as education and health care.

1 Strongly agree
2 Slightly agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Slightly disagree
5 Strongly disagree

Appendix II – WP6 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWER: [Here introduce the project aims and explain the structure of the survey.]

Hi, my name is _____. Firstly, I would like to thank you for your willingness to participate in this interview. As we said with the questionnaire, with funding support from the European Union, [Maastricht University/ University of Amsterdam/ Koç University/ the American University of Beirut] are looking to understand people's experiences and thoughts about development interventions here and migration. I would like to ask you some questions today to understand more detail about the answers that you gave in the survey. This interview attempts to gather all the necessary information to better understand the situation here and make appropriate recommendations. The results of the research will be shared with policymakers and we do hope it can help to improve the situation for local communities and migrants.

All information you share with me today is completely confidential and anonymous, and neither your name nor identity will be shared. You can stop the interview at any time. I want to be clear that this interview is only for research purposes, and nothing that you say will be shared with the authorities. I also am not in a position to help you with the authorities or your situation here. Now that you have been informed of the purpose and nature of the interview, are you willing to participate?

A.   Current Conditions (all respondents)

I would like to know more about your experiences in this country, and what your current plans are.

(*if the respondent has another country of origin*)

1. **When you arrived here, what were your initial plans?**
    a. [*If planned to stay*] Why?
    b. [*If planned to move on*] Why? Where to?
    c. What was your initial plan based on – information sources/other people?
2. **And what has happened – are those still your current plans, or have your plans changed?**
    d. Why have your plans changed/stayed the same? (i.e. what determined the decision)
    e. [*If plans changed*]: How have your plans changed?
    f.   *Probe on the impact of any particular policies/events in the country of transit/current residence*

(*all respondents*)

3. **Please tell me about your life here. What do you like about your life here? What is challenging for you? What do you think would assist you with those challenges?**
    Probe for
    -    Family life (children?)
    -    Housing
    -    Work or study and conditions – how do you spend your day?
    -    Community / Personal networks
    -    Safety and security

B.   Development Interventions

1. **Have you or a member of your household received formal support or assistance in the last five years?**
    (If no à skip to next section)
2. **What organisation(s) offered the support?**
3. **Please describe the support or the programme(s).**
    a.   When did it start? How long has the programme been running?
    b.   Who is eligible for it?

    Probe for

- Skills training
- Food aid
- Cash transfer
- Shelter or other non-food items
- Support with agricultural activities
- Help to access markets
- Services provision (e.g. education, health, legal etc.)
- Help to access services (e.g. school enrolment)
- Information about migration/opportunities in this country

4. **What were your expectations of the support? Did the support meet your expectations?**
    a. *(If the programme covers more than basic needs)* What motivated you to take part in the programme?

5. **Has it changed your quality of life? How?**
    Probe for
    - Economic effects (ability to earn/ provide basic needs)
    - Social effects (e.g. accepted by community / stigmatised by the community)
    - Psychological effects (e.g. confidence, feelings of security)

6. **Have you received informal support? From whom? What type of support? What does this mean to you?** *Informal support would be charity from locals or other refugees.*

C. Plan to Migrate or Stay

1. **Do you intend to continue living in this country indefinitely or do you intend to live in another country for a period of at least three months?** *(if applicable)* **Do you intend to return to your country of origin?**
    a. *If the respondent wants to go abroad / return à section E*
    b. *If the respondent does not want to go abroad à section D*

D. Factors in the Decision to Stay (*If the respondent does not want to go abroad*)

I am going to ask you separately why you would like to stay and why you do not want to migrate.

1. **Why do you want to stay in this country? What are the most important reasons?**
    Probe for
    - Economic factors (employment, salary, investment)
    - Social factors (family, friends, dependents)
    - Cultural factors (language, religion)
    - Legal factors (citizenship?)
    - Access to services (schools, health etc.)
    - Security situation

2. **Are there reasons why you do *not* want to migrate?**
    Probe for
    - Not enough information?
    - Prohibitive costs?
    - Law enforcement
    - Safety
    - Don't know a smuggler
    - Legal factors (lack of legal pathways?)
    - Stories of personal connections

3. **Has anything happened to change your mind about a decision to stay in the last five years?**
    Probe for
    - Economic situation changed (employment, salary, investment)
    - Social factors (family, friends, dependents)
    - Cultural factors (learnt the language)

- Legal change (citizenship opportunity?)
- Access to services (schools, health etc.)
- Security situation
- Development intervention

E.   Factors in the Decision to Migrate (*If the respondent wants to go abroad/return*)

I am going to ask you separately why you would like to go and why you do not want to stay.

1.   **Where would you like to go?**
2.   **Would like to move permanently or for a short period and then return? How long?**
3.   **What do you think your life would be like in another country? Why would you like to live in another country? What are the most important reasons?**
    a. *Probe for*
    - Economic factors (employment, salary, living conditions)
    - Social factors (family, friends, dependents encouraging going/have gone?)
    - Cultural factors (language, religion)
    - Legal factors (citizenship?)
    - Access to services (schools, health etc.)
    - Security situation
    - (if return) Has the political/economic situation changed? Nostalgia?
4.   **Are there reasons why you do *not* want to stay?**
    Probe for
    - Economic situation (employment, salary, living conditions)
    - Social factors (no family?)
    - Cultural (differences in language or religion)
    - Legal status (no citizenship opportunity? Settlement times are too long)
    - Lack of access to services (schools, health etc.)
    - Safety and security situation
5.   **Has anything happened to change your mind about a decision to migrate in the last five years?**
    a. *Probe for*
    - Economic situation changed (employment opportunity, salary, investment)
    - Social factors (family, friends, dependents)
    - Cultural factors (learnt the language)
    - Legal change (citizenship opportunity? Resettlement?)
    - Access to services (schools, health etc.)
    - Security situation
    - Development intervention
6.   *(If returning to the country of origin)* **Are you planning to return using the Assisted Voluntary Return Programme from IOM?**
    a.   How did you hear about this programme?
    b.   Did this programme persuade you to return? Or support a decision you already made?

F.   Migration Decision Making Processes

I would like to understand more about where you get your information regarding migrating or staying.

1.   **Where did you get your information about travelling to live in another country? Have you heard stories about the risks of making the journey and moving to another country?**
    a.   How did these stories make you feel?
    b.   Where did these stories come from? Did any of these stories come from UNHCR or another NGO?
    c.   Did you trust/believe in these stories?
    d.   Have they affected your decision making?

2. **When learning about living in other countries or making the journey across borders, which sources of information are most and least trustworthy, in your opinion?**

I would like to know more about how you have made your decisions about migration.

3. **Do you feel you can make this decision on your own, or do other people decide for you, or do you feel you have no choice?**

   a. Have others influenced you? Who? In what way? How important was their opinion?

4. **How definite are you about your decision to stay or migrate?**

   a. Do you think you might change your mind in the future?

I would like to you know more about what factors are most important to you in deciding whether to stay or migrate.

5. **Are there any factors that would change your mind about either staying or migrating?**

6. **What is most important to you when deciding if you would want to stay in this country?**

   a. *Probe for*
      i. Economic situation (employment opportunity, salary, investment)
      ii. Social factors (family, friends, dependents)
      iii. Cultural factors (language learning, practice religion)
      iv. Legal change (citizenship opportunity)
      v. Access to services (schools, health, legal etc.)
      vi. Safety and security situation
      vii. Development intervention

7. **Have any development interventions in this community affected your decision to stay or migrate?**

   a. Which programme? Why?
   b. Is this a temporary or permanent decision?

G.   Future Plans

1. **What do you hope for the future for you and your household?**

   a. (*if expressed a desire to move abroad*) Have you made any preparations for living in another country? (e.g. purchased a ticket, applied for a visa)
   b. Training programmes?
   c. Employment/business ambitions
   d. Family reunification/formation

2. **What do you think could be done to improve people's quality of life here?**

3. **Is there anything else you would like to tell me today?**

Closing: Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me today, we really appreciate learning about your experiences. Do you have any questions for me?